There have been a number of econometric studies of the effect of changes in management and control on the productivity and employment of private, but not of public, enterprises. This paper examines the impact of changes in political administration on the productivity and employment of the entire executive branch of the U.S. government using data compiled under the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Federal Productivity Measurement Program.
Previous research has indicated that changes in the management and control of private enterprises have significant effects on their productivity and employment. Siegel (1987, 1990a) found that the productivity of manufacturing plants increased significantly (relative to average industry productivity) afier a change in ownership or leveraged buyout.
They also found ( 1990b) that changes in ownership were associated with substantial reductions in the employment of (relatively highly-paid) white-collar workers in corporate headquarters and other "auxiliary establishments" (but not in the employment of production workers).
The executive branch of the Federal government, which employs almost 3 million people, undergoes regular changes in leadership and control: there is a presidential election eve~four years. Although there are many important differences between the private and public sectors, the hypothesis that control changes have similar effects on productivity and employment in the two sectors is a plausible one. 1 However we are not aware of any ' Recent research (Lichtenberg ( 1993) and Lehr and Lichtenberg ( 1996) ) suggests that the introduction of information technology has similar effects on productivity in business and government. (1994, 1996) for detailed discussions of the Federal productivity data. 3The output series compiled under the FPMP reflect~activities of the organizations being measured, that is, the outputs used by groups outside the organization. Not all outputs, however, are fial to the Federal government in that some measured outputs (e.g., maintenance, personnel, and supply) are used by other government organizations. Thus, the FPMP summary statistics reflect the productivity of the measured organizations, not the Federal government as a whole. Measured productivity may perhaps be regarded as the sum of true productivity and a classical ("white-noise") measurement error. If this error is uncorrelated with changes in administration, our estimates of the effect of the latter will be unbiased. We are interested in examining the relationship between government productivity and employment grotih and the "age" of the political administration, At. The latter was defined to be equal to 1 in the first year following each presidential election (1969, 1973,.,,, 1993) , to 2 in the second year, and so forth, The years 1985-88 were treated as years 5-8 of the Reagan administration. Time-series data for & p, and I are presented in Table 1 . where FIRSTYEARt = 1 if& = 1, and otherwise equals zero, and Q is the residual. This implies that productivity growth in the first year of an administration tends to be 1.2 percentage points higher than it is afier the first year, Since the average rate of productivity growth is 1.1Yo,the annual rate of productivi~growth i)z the first year is 2.6 times as high as it is in subsequent years; over 40% of all government productivity growth occurs in the first year of political administrations.
Next we consider the relationship between total executive branch employment growth and the "age" or year of the administration. hypothesize that sharp decreases in crude oil prices may have this effect on oil companies, and Scherer (1992) and others argue that increases in foreign competition may have this effect on manufacturing companies,) But as an administration's tenure increases, waste, inefficiency, and fat tend to accumulate in the executive branch. 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 .1 q ******** q ** q ****. q ******** q ******** q *:!+ q *+,***** q ******** q **8 ** *****.* 
